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The Aftermath of Stanford v. Roche: Which
Law of Assignments Governs?
Sean M. O’Connor, J.D., M.A.*
The discovery and commercialization of biotechnology innovations often rely
on collaborations between universities and for-profit firms. In the United States, the
federal government funds much of university life sciences research and, under the
Bayh-Dole Act,1 has some rights to research arising from that funding. Two impor-
tant strands of invention ownership issues in this web of collaboration arose under
litigation that culminated in the recent United States Supreme Court decision Board
of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc.
(“Stanford v. Roche” or “Stanford”).2 The first is the question of whether Bayh-
Dole trumps any other invention assignment agreements when federal funding was
used in any part for the invention. The second is whether a 1991 development in
the case law of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (the
“Federal Circuit”) regarding invention assignments is binding federal common law.
While the Supreme Court limited itself to the first question — because the petition
for certiorari was so limited — some of the justices addressed the second in a con-
currence and a dissent. This article discusses both strands, while paying particular
attention to the emerging battle over the Federal Circuit’s “federal common law” of
assignments. Part I reviews the facts of the case. Part II delves into the Bayh-Dole
issues. Part III concludes the article by analyzing the Federal Circuit’s federal com-
mon law of assignments and addressing the open issues which may result in a Su-
preme Court challenge next year.
1. BACKGROUND FACTS OF STANFORD V. ROCHE
The salient facts of Stanford v. Roche are as follows. Dr. Mark Holodniy be-
came a research fellow at Stanford University in 1988.3 He executed Stanford’s
then standard Copyright and Patent Agreement (“CPA”) which provided that he
“‘agree[d] to assign’ to Stanford his ‘right, title, and interest in’ inventions resulting
from his employment” at Stanford.4 His work required him to learn and use the
polymerase chain reaction technique (“PCR”) that Cetus Corporation had pio-
neered. Cetus was already collaborating with Stanford on research in this area, and
Holodniy’s supervisor arranged for him to learn PCR at Cetus and pursue a sub-
* Professor of Law and Faculty Director, Law, Business & Entrepreneurship Program,
University of Washington School of Law. Contact: soconnor@uw.edu.
1 P.L. 96-517 §6 (Dec. 12, 1980).
2 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011).
3 Id. at 2192; Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University v. Roche Molecular Systems,
Inc., 583 F.3d 832, 837 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
4 131 S. Ct. at 2192.
30   INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL [24 I.P.J.]
stantial part of his research there with Cetus employees. Upon arriving at Cetus,
Holodniy executed Cetus’ Visitor’s Confidentiality Agreement (“VCA”), which
provided that he “‘will assign and do[es] hereby assign’ to Cetus his ‘right, title and
interest in each of the ideas, inventions and improvements’ made ‘as a consequence
of [his] access’ to Cetus.”5 After nine months, during which the invention at the
heart of this case was conceived, Holodniy returned to Stanford to test and refine
the invention. He worked with colleagues there, allegedly under federal funding.6
In 1991, Roche Molecular Systems, Inc. (Roche), purchased all of Cetus’ PCR-
related assets. Over the next few years it conducted clinical trials on the PCR HIV
technique as it had been developed while Holodniy was still at Cetus, and then
developed and distributed commercial kits worldwide.7 In 1992, Holodniy and his
Stanford colleagues finished testing and refining the invention. Stanford then ob-
tained invention assignments from them all and filed patent applications on the
technique.8 Three patents ultimately issued, in 1999, 2003, and 2006.9 In 2000,
Stanford approached Roche about taking a license to the Holodniy patents, but
Roche responded that it was a co-owner or licensee of the inventions — under the
terms of the VCA, some materials transfer agreements, and under common law
shop rights — and declined to take a license.10 Stanford sued Roche for patent in-
fringement in 2005.11
The district court resolved the case largely in Stanford’s favor by adopting a
legally recursive timeline of events. First, the court found, there was an agreement
to assign inventions that did not yet exist to Stanford under the CPA at some inde-
terminate time in the future. Second, there was an actual, immediate assignment of
inventions (that still did not exist) to Roche (Cetus) under the VCA that, barring the
later Bayh-Dole consideration, would have made it impossible for Holodniy to
honor his obligation to later assign his inventions to Stanford at their call. Third,
the receipt of federal funding by Stanford to actually reduce the now existent inven-
tion to practice brought any patents arising from this work under the provisions of
Bayh-Dole. And fourth, the filing of patent applications then retroactively stripped
Holodniy of any title he had to the invention at any point in time, including when
he executed the VCA. Thus, two later in time agreements had the effect of super-
seding earlier agreements even without any actual modification of the earlier con-
tracts. While the district court did not clearly articulate its views on the interaction
of the CPA and VCA, it relied on a view that Bayh-Dole grants the government a
right of first refusal to inventions arising under federal funding agreements, and
grants the recipient of federal funds, the “contractor” in Bayh-Dole parlance, a
“right of second refusal.”12 This would leave the actual inventor — who is gener-
5 Id.
6 583 F.3d at 838, 131 S. Ct. at 2192. Stanford was never able to produce the govern-
ment funding agreement.
7 131 S. Ct. at 2192.
8 583 F.3d at 838, 131 S. Ct. at 2192.
9 Ibid.
10 583 F.3d at 838.
11 131 S. Ct. at 2193.
12 487 F.Supp.2d 1099, 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
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ally not a party to the funding agreement — with only a residual interest in the
inventions conditional on both the government and contractor electing not to exer-
cise their rights.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s Bayh-Dole holding
and articulated why the VCA trumped the CPA. This left Roche with an ownership
interest in the patents and thus deprived Stanford of standing in the case.13 The
court rejected the district court’s “right of second refusal” construct for contrac-
tors.14 It adopted another district court’s ruling that “‘the primary purpose of the
Bayh-Dole Act is to regulate relationships of small business and nonprofit grantees
with the Government, not between grantees and the inventors who work for
them.’”15 However, the Federal Circuit allowed that if the contractor or its employ-
ees have done anything to violate provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act, then the govern-
ment may be able to void these actions and take title for itself.16 With regard to the
CPA and VCA, the Federal Circuit held that the former had only established a
promise to do some act in the future at Stanford’s request — essentially a call op-
tion — while the latter transferred rights upon its execution. Thus, while Holodniy
arguably breached the CPA when he signed the VCA, Stanford had no action
against Roche directly and would have to pursue recourse against Holodniy.17
2. RESOLUTION OF THE BAYH-DOLE ISSUE
Stanford petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari on the Bayh-Dole issue
only. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the Federal Circuit. In
particular, it reaffirmed its earlier holdings that rights in an invention belong to the
inventor, absent some express transfer between the inventor and his employer or
another.18 It then rejected Stanford’s argument that Bayh-Dole is a “vesting stat-
ute” similar to the Atomic Energy Act, in which title to relevant inventions is vested
in designated agencies by act of law.19 Further, it focused on the definition under
Bayh-Dole which requires that a “subject invention” (those inventions subject to
the provisions of Bayh-Dole) be an “invention of the contractor.”20 Under the ma-
jority’s view, the emphasized portion would be superfluous if any invention arising
under federal funding were subject to Bayh-Dole. Instead, the court held that a sub-
ject invention is one to which the contractor lawfully has rights or title. Most im-
portantly, the title allocation rules under Bayh-Dole, which leave the inventor with
13 Stanford continued to have rights to the patents through Holodniy’s Stanford research
colleagues, who had not signed away their rights to any other party.
14 583 F.3d at 844
15 Id. at 845 (quoting Fenn v. Yale Univ., 393 F.Supp.2d 133, 141-2 (D. Conn. 2004)).
16 By contrast, the Stanford district court had held that such actions were automatically
void. 487 F.Supp.2d at 1118-9.
17 The district court and the Federal Circuit also considered Stanford’s arguments based
on the bona fide purchaser provisions of the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §261, but found
them unpersuasive. Discussion of that topic is beyond the scope of this short article.
18 131 S. Ct. at 2195.
19 Id. at 2195-6.
20 Id. at 2196 (emphasis added).
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only a conditioned residual interest where neither the government nor the contrac-
tor elect to take title, only apply to subject inventions.
This was the correct ruling, despite opposing briefs filed by the Association
for University Technology Managers (“AUTM”), the Association of American
Universities (“AAU”), and a number of major research universities. Those associa-
tions and universities sought to preserve and protect a practice that many universi-
ties had developed which was to rely on Bayh-Dole as a backstop for any defective,
incomplete, or simply missing assignments. While convenient for the universities,
it was never in compliance with Bayh-Dole and its implementing regulations. Reli-
ance on this misinterpretation of Bayh-Dole also allowed those that so chose to
build faculty-friendly assignment policies which left title with faculty unless the
invention arose under a specific outside funding agreement that required transfer of
rights, such as federal funding agreements and corporate sponsored research agree-
ments. Stanford and a few other schools actively promoted their reputations for
being the most faculty friendly in this regard and put in place IP policies that
backed this reputation up. Such policies and their promotion paid dividends for
these schools in terms of star faculty recruitment and retention.
A brief review of the history of Bayh Dole and federal government patent
policy shows why the Supreme Court was correct and why the universities’ prac-
tice was ill-founded. Bayh-Dole is sometimes portrayed as an ex nihilo event that
established university technology transfer when there was none, or at the very least
created an entirely new regulatory framework for it. However, it was in fact largely
built upon, and unified, existing policies and regulation dating back to the early
1960s.21
These policies themselves were built upon the influential Investigation of
Gov’t Patent Practices and Policies: Report and Recommendations of the Attorney
General to the President issued by then Attorney General Francis Biddle in 1947
(the “AG Report”).22 The AG Report summarized United States patent law with
regard to inventorship and initial ownership as it existed at that time (and which
remains the same today) and made clear that government contractors must have
invention title assigned to them: 
Under our law, a patentable invention can be made only by an individual or
by several individuals working jointly. Since the Government contractor is
usually a corporation or an institution, the latter’s agreement to make some
or all of the patent rights available to the Government requires a correspond-
ing obligation on the part of the contractors’ employees who engage in per-
forming the research contract. Such an obligation is as a general rule im-
posed expressly by the employment contract.23
21 Sean O’Connor et al., Legal Context of University Intellectual Property and Technol-
ogy Transfer 7–23 (report prepared for The National Academies, Sep. 20, 2010, availa-
ble at http://sites.nationalacademies.org/PGA/step/PGA_058712) [hereinafter
“O’Connor”].
22 Francis Biddle, Attorney General, Investigation of Gov’t Patent Practices and Policies:
Report and Recommendations of the Attorney General to the President (1947) [herein-
after “AG Report”]; O’Connor at 7–15.
23 AG Report, vol. 1 at 78.
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The AG Report then referenced extensive research done on the actual prac-
tices of both private industry and nonprofit research organizations and universities,
and concluded that: 
. . . the scientific and technical employees of almost all industrial organiza-
tions are under contract to assign their patent rights to the employer, and
most academic and other noncommercial institutions likewise require as-
signment of patent rights by members of their staff who have been detailed
to perform research contracts with third parties. Hence the disposition of
rights to inventions made under a Government-financed research contract
involves the allocation between Government and contractor of the power to
exclude others from using the invention, or to permit such use upon pay-
ment of a royalty or compliance with some other legal condition.24
This reliance on contractors’ existing practice to secure invention assignments
from inventors, and the corollary that federal policy need only then concern itself
with the allocation of title as between federal agencies and the contractor entity,
became a fundamental assumption of government contracting and procurement pol-
icy that continues to this day.
This assumption is also consistent with the past and current practice of organi-
zation-to-organization contracting in the private sector. Corporations and other
non-natural legal persons usually draft their contracts with each other as the sole
parties, i.e., without adding each other’s employees as parties to the agreement un-
less there is some supervening reason to do so. At most, the contracts may impose
on each party the obligation to enter into appropriate arrangements with employees
to protect the other party’s rights under the contract.25 This tracking of private sec-
tor contracting principles for government policy and contracting purposes paral-
leled the established law of title allocation for inventions by employed inventors.26
The Kennedy Administration was the first to act on the AG Report with regard
to extramural research and development (“R&D”).27 Its primary purpose was to
establish a uniform government patent title allocation policy for such R&D con-
tracts based upon the recommendations of the AG Report. The Kennedy Memo
addressed only the allocation as between the government and contractors. Thus, it
clearly appeared to rely on the AG Report’s assumption that contractors would se-
cure necessary assignments from employees, and therefore policy need only be
made for allocation as between the government and its contractors. At the same
time, the Kennedy Memo expanded the opportunities for contractors to retain title
beyond the recommendations of the AG Report and existing practices of a number
of federal agencies. However, it was never implemented in government-wide regu-
24 AG Report, vol. 1 at 88.
25 For example, when confidentiality is a term of the contract, the party owing the duty of
confidentiality may be explicitly required to secure an adequate level of confidentiality
from the relevant employees. Likewise, where the allocation of intellectual property
rights (“IP”) is a term of the contract, the relevant parties may be explicitly required to
secure the necessary assignments or licenses from employees.
26 AG Report, vol. 1 at 78.
27 Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 28 Fed. Reg.
10,943 (Oct. 12, 1963), 3 C.F.R. §861 (1959–1963) [hereinafter “Kennedy Memo”];
O’Connor at 9-10.
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lations, in large part because a number of agency and technology specific patent
title allocation statutes had been passed by Congress in the first half of the 20th
century.28
The Nixon Administration essentially reissued the Kennedy Memo, with mi-
nor modifications primarily intended to increase further the opportunities for con-
tractor retention of title.29 The Nixon Memo thus also addressed only allocation of
title as between the government and contractors, continuing the assumption of, and
reliance on, contractors securing appropriate title rights from employee-inventors.
Despite the continued existence of the ad hoc invention title allocation statutes, the
Nixon Administration directed the General Services Administration (“GSA”) to
promulgate government-wide patent title allocation regulations to implement the
Nixon Memo. GSA issued an interim version of the regulations in 1973 and a final
version in 1975.30 These regulations were also then built upon the premise of con-
tractor responsibility for securing title rights from employees, and now explicitly
required contractors to secure the rights by mandating the inclusion of different
versions of a Patent Rights Clause, depending on the exact funding circumstances,
in all federal extramural R&D contracts.31
Developing alongside these formal policies and regulations was the Institu-
tional Patent Agreement (“IPA”) system used by agencies and departments, includ-
ing the National Institutes of Health, the then Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, and the National Science Foundation.32 The IPAs were master agreements
between research or higher education institutions and federal agencies that set forth
the patent allocation terms for all research funded at the institution by the agency.
Similar to the GSA regulations, and governed by them after they were promul-
gated, the IPAs expressly placed the burden of securing patent rights from inven-
tors on the contractors. The IPA concept originated in the 1950s, predating both the
Kennedy Memo and the GSA regulations. A publicly available version of a stan-
dard form of IPA from 1978 includes a good example of the explicit clause requir-
ing the contractor to secure rights from inventors in conformance with the then
28 O’Connor at 10–13.
29 Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on Government Pat-
ent Policy, 36 Fed. Reg. 16,887 (Aug. 31, 1971) [hereinafter “Nixon Memo”];
O’Connor at 13.
30 O’Connor at 13-14.
31 Federal Procurement Regulations §§1-9.107, 1-9.107-5(a)–(c) (Patent Rights — Ac-
quisition by the Government, Subsection (e)(3)),1-9.107-6(a)-(b) (Patent Rights — Ac-
quisition by the Government (Short Form), Subsection (e)(1)) (“The Contractor shall
obtain patent agreements to effectuate the provisions of this clause from all persons in
his employ who perform any part of the work under this contract except nontechnical
personnel, such as clerical employees and manual laborers.”); GSA, Federal Procure-
ment Regulations, Part 1–9, Patents, Data and Copyrights: Allocation of Rights in In-
ventions, 40 Fed. Reg. 19,814 (May 7, 1975).
32 O’Connor at 11–16; John H. Raubitschek and Norman J. Latker, Reasonable Pric-
ing — A New Twist for March-In Rights Under the Bayh-Dole Act, 22 Santa Clara
Comp. & High tech. L.J. 149, 153 (2005); Gov’t Patent Policies: Institutional Patent
Agreements, Hearings before the Senate Subcomm. on Monopoly and Anticompetitive
Activities of the Select Comm. on Small Bus. (95th Cong., 2d Sess., May 22, 1978).
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governing GSA regulations.33
By the time the Bayh-Dole Act was passed in 1980, the Federal Procurement
Regulations system was well established, and the requirements for federal extramu-
ral R&D contracts were embedded within and governed by it. However, despite
efforts to create uniform government-wide patent policies, there remained ad hoc
patent allocation statutes across the U.S. Code. The variability that they enabled or
mandated for different federal department and agency extramural research policies
resulted in a patchwork of different bureaucratic systems and rules for funding
agreements. Overall, the tendency was still to require contractors to assign title to
the federal funding agency, although this was by no means universal. Bayh-Dole
then was intended to establish a truly uniform government-wide statutory default
rule of contractor retention of title, albeit limited to nonprofit organization and
small business contractors. Crucially, it facilitated this by explicitly superseding the
ad hoc title allocation statutes by a new statutory provision.34 There is no evidence
that this section was intended to change any other legal relationships or the initial
vesting of title in natural person inventors. Changing the latter would have entailed
a profound revision of established practice and federal and state law, warranting at
least some discussion in the legislative history, of which there is none. Instead,
§210 was necessary simply to supersede the existing ad hoc statutes only to the
extent that they would require “a disposition of rights in subject inventions of small
business firms or nonprofit organizations contractors in a manner that is inconsis-
tent with this chapter . . ..”35 The intent was still to allocate title rights only as
between the federal agencies and their nonprofit and small business contractors.
Accordingly, the quoted language limits itself to inventions of the contractors, i.e.,
those to which they hold good title.
Thus, the first step in analyzing the effect of §210 on any particular situation is
to determine whether the small business firm or nonprofit organization contractor
holds title to the invention. This, in turn, relies on determining whether the contrac-
tor has secured assignment of the invention from the inventors. If it has, then the
allocation of title is, according to Bayh-Dole’s rules, as specified in the funding
agreement. If the contractor does not hold title to the invention, then the title alloca-
tion will be determined according to the underlying statute, to the extent it is still in
effect and applicable. Section 210 is open-ended with regard to which other statutes
it supersedes (“including but not necessarily limited to”) only because it anticipated
that other statutes might be identified later, and future statutes might be passed,
which affect title allocation as between small business firms and/or nonprofit or-
33 “The Institution shall obtain patent agreements to effectuate the provisions of this
Agreement from all persons in its employ who perform any part of the work under any
contract except nontechnical personnel, such as clerical and manual laborers.” Institu-
tional Patent Agreement, §V(b), U.S. Senate, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Mo-
nopoly and Anticompetitive Activities of the Select Comm. on Small Business, 95th
Cong. (May 22, 23, June 20, 21, and 26, 1978) (Part 2: Appendix: GSA submission for
the record: Minutes of meetings of interagency committees on revision of the draft of
the Government-wide IPA (notes omitted), pp. 1831–43).
34 35 U.S.C. §210.
35 35 U.S.C. §210 (emphasis added).
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ganization contractors.36
Nothing in the legislative history of Bayh-Dole indicates that it was intended
to change the standard Federal Procurement Regulations rules other than to insti-
tute a default rule of contractor title for small business and nonprofit contractors (as
between the contractor and federal funding agency). Similar to the Kennedy Memo
and Nixon Memo, Bayh-Dole and its legislative history focus only on the allocation
of title as between the contractor and the federal funding agency.37 This is again
because both the standard practice of securing assignments from employee-inven-
tors was asserted to be settled and the GSA regulations had established an explicit
requirement for such assignments in the patent rights clauses mandated for use in
all extramural R&D contracts. Thus, for example, even where there is a reference
to Bayh-Dole “automatically” granting title to small businesses and nonprofits
(subject to agency invocation of the exceptions to the default rule) in the Senate
Report that serves as the Bayh-Dole’s primary legislative history,38 this comment
was directed to the fact that the Act was intended to change the existing ex post
determination of title allocation as between contractor and federal agency into an ex
ante system in which the allocation was predetermined under the funding agree-
ment (and hence was “automatic”).
In sum, Bayh-Dole’s implementing regulations continued the GSA regula-
tions’ explicit requirement for contractors to secure patent rights from employee-
inventors. Further, these implementing regulations broadly tracked the earlier GSA
regulations, creating a chain of continuity in the basic administration and content of
the federal R&D procurement system, even for provisions not expressly required
by Bayh-Dole, and including the continuation of mandatory standard patent rights
clauses.39
3. UNRESOLVED ISSUES OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S
FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF ASSIGNMENTS
While the court was constrained to the Bayh-Dole issue by Stanford’s petition
for certiorari, a concurrence and a dissent expressed concern over the Federal Cir-
cuit’s holding on the VCA issue.40 Under these views, the majority’s holding on
the Bayh-Dole issue, combined with the Federal Circuit case law, provides oppor-
tunity and incentive for inventors — and contractors — to circumvent Bayh-Dole’s
title allocation system. For these justices, the Federal Circuit’s 1991 ruling in
36 35 U.S.C. §210 (“The Act creating this chapter shall be construed to take precedence
over any future Act unless that Act specifically cites this Act and provides that it shall
take precedence over this Act”).
37 With the exception of the mandatory sharing of royalties with inventors in the case of
nonprofit contractors, 35 U.S.C. §202(c)(7)(B) (2006), discussed in Part V infra, and
the process for granting title back to inventors where contractors had originally secured
title rights from the inventor, but then chose not to elect rights as against the federal
funding agency under the Act, 35 U.S.C. §202(d) (2006).
38 Senate Rep. 96-480 at 36.
39 O’Connor at 15–23.
40 Id. at 2199–2205 (J. Sotomayor concurring, JJ. Breyer and Ginsburg dissenting).
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FilmTec Corp. v. Allied Signal, Inc.41 should be revisited.
In that case, the court asserted that the assignment of rights in an invention
that does not yet exist is an assignment of an expectant or future interest and grants
at most equitable title until the invention is actually made and a patent application
filed.42 However, immediately upon the filing of a patent application on the inven-
tion, legal title to the invention rights vests in the assignee with no further action
required.43 At the same time, actual assignments of expectant interests must be dis-
tinguished from mere obligations to assign rights in the future.44 The latter are
often used when the prospective assignee does not know in advance whether it
wants title to the future invention and thus establishes what is essentially a call
option. In contrast to the present assignment of future interests, when an obligation
to assign is entered into and an invention is later made (and a patent application is
filed), no transfer of title occurs until and unless the option is called. In the
meantime, the inventor may legally assign any of her rights to third parties. Of
course, if and when the holder of the call option calls it in, then the assignor will
not be able to honor that option and convey the invention rights (unless she can
reacquire them from the current assignee). At this point, she would be in breach of
her option agreement. But the counter party to that agreement would only be able to
use for contract damages and not for an equitable remedy that would require con-
veyance of the inventions rights.
The FilmTec court did not state whether it was basing its decision on an appli-
cation of state law — which normally governs contract law interpretation — or es-
tablishing a rule of federal common law. This remained murky though later deci-
sions,45 until the 2008 decision in DDB Technologies, L.L.C. v. MLB Advanced
Media, L.P.46 In that case, the Federal Circuit squarely held that invention assign-
ment agreements are governed by federal common law because they are integral to
the question of standing in federal patent cases.47
The concurring and dissenting Supreme Court justices in Stanford seemed
concerned as to both the rule that federal common law governs invention assign-
ment agreements and that rule’s distinction between assignments of future interests
and obligations to assign. Their concern appears rooted in how Stanford lost control
of Holodniy’s rights and potentially jeopardized the government’s rights in the in-
vention. But, when Holodniy executed the CPA, FilmTec had not been decided and
some attorneys in California may have believed that state’s contract law provided
that obligations to assign — under the “agree to assign” language — effected an
immediate transfer just as present conveyances of future interests — under the
“hereby assign” — did.
At least this seemed to be the guidance that the University of California sys-
41 939 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
42 Id. at 1572.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 1573.
45 See Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc., 211 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2000); IpVenture, Inc. v.
ProStar Computer, Inc., 503 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
46 517 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
47 Id.
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tem appears to have received. In Shaw v. The Regents of the University of Califor-
nia, an associate professor at the University of California, Davis brought a declara-
tory judgment action against the university to establish his rights to receive 50 per
cent of the revenues received by the university on his inventions, per the terms of
the patent agreement he signed as a condition of his original employment.48 Some
years into his employment, the university unilaterally changed its patent policy to
reduce the royalty percentages paid to inventors. Shaw argued that the while the
university could change its policy generally, such changes would not apply to him
until and unless he agreed to modify his written patent agreement. In defending
against this action, the university argued inter alia that Shaw had effected a “com-
plete transfer of [his] right to the University” when he executed the original patent
agreement, based on “agree to assign” language within it.49 However, the trial court
found this, and the university’s other arguments, unpersuasive and granted Shaw
the declaratory relief he sought on summary judgment motion. On appeal, the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals for the Third District affirmed the lower court in all re-
gards. Most relevant for this article, it found that the university’s arguments on the
effect of the “agree to assign” language were based on mistaken readings of earlier
cases.
In particular, the Shaw court cited Cubic Corporation v. William B. Marty, in
which the patent agreement at issue had a slightly different conveyance of future
interests phrase: “Employee assigns and hereby agrees to assign.”50 The Cubic
court still found this phrase to constitute an immediate conveyance of Marty’s fu-
ture interests in his inventions. This is likely because the phrase still contained the
present conveyance phrase “employee assigns.”51 Further, it was clear in the agree-
ment that Marty was assigning all of his future rights. By contrast, the patent agree-
ment Shaw signed only provided that he disclose all future inventions and then “. . .
[s]hould the University deem the invention patentable, the signatory promises
thereafter ‘to assign to University all rights, title and interest’ in the invention.”52
This was more clearly in the nature of an option agreement. How could Shaw have
assigned his rights in future inventions at the time of executing the patent agree-
ment if the university would later choose which future inventions disclosed by
Shaw would be assigned by Shaw at that later date? To work the way the university
alleged, the patent agreement would have to be interpreted to mean that Shaw as-
signed all of his future interests upon execution of the agreement, and then the
university would have the right (obligation?) to assign back any future inventions
for which it did not want title. But this is quite a stretch from the contract language.
48 58 Cal.App.4th 44 (Cal. 3d Dist., 1997).
49 58 Cal.App.4th at 53. Presumably, this defense was based on counsel’s interpretation
of then current California state law.
50 185 Cal.App.3d 438 (1986).
51 Further, the longer phrase is similar to other modern present conveyance phrases such
as “agrees to assign and hereby does assign.” These variants are not trying to combine
present conveyances and call option-type obligations to assign. Rather, they are likely
signifying that the assignee has voluntarily agreed to assign the future interests and is
also in fact assigning them at that time.
52 58 Cal.App.4th at 48.
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Thus, the Shaw court properly found that the patent agreement granted the
university only a call option-type right for it to demand that Shaw assign future
inventions when they arose at the university’s election. As such, the Shaw court
clarified that the “agree to assign” language did not effect a present conveyance of
future interests. However, the appellate decision was not handed down until 1997,
and FilmTec was not decided until 1991. Holodniy had executed the CPA in 1988,
so arguably Stanford may have believed that California state law gave the same
legal effect to “agree to assign” and “hereby assign” at that time (similar to the
University of California’s apparent belief about the law). Further, the Federal Cir-
cuit was not clear in FilmTec that it was creating federal common law. Of course,
the case was on appeal from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
California, and so one should have presumed that whatever state law related issues
were decided would be under California law, or binding on California parties going
forward.
The bigger question is why some universities — including Stanford — contin-
ued using the “agree to assign” language even after FilmTec and, for California
universities, Shaw.53 Holding aside the case where the universities might simply
have remained ignorant about the state of the law, there are a few reasons why
these universities may have chosen to take the risks of continuing to use the obliga-
tion to assign language. One is that the university will not know at the time of a
researcher’s hire whether all, or even which, of her future inventions should be
university property. Second, the university may (incorrectly) believe that it cannot
take title to things that do not yet exist.54 Third, the university may be confusing
the federal tax exempt rules prohibiting the assignment of expectant interests by the
entity to others with the permissible assignment of expectant interests from an em-
ployee or contractor to the entity.
All three of these are simply misunderstandings of the law. The first poten-
tially remains a problem, but has three straightforward solutions. First, universities
can use the “hereby assign” language in assignment agreements and then simply
assign back inventions as needed. As an alternative to this, the agreement could
have the researcher assign her future inventions to an escrow agent who would
operate under the same rules as the university would use in later determining
whether to take title to inventions as they arose. Then, as the inventions arose and
were disclosed by the inventor to the escrow agent, the latter would apply the rules
and assign the invention rights to the university or inventor, as applicable. Second,
universities can craft a scope of future interests that have been presently assigned
upon execution of the patent agreement. For example, the clause could state
“faculty member hereby assigns all rights, title, and interest to future inventions
developed in total or in part under federal funding agreements.” This could of
course contain other factors, such as corporate sponsored research agreements.
Third, universities can institute a “supremacy clause,” such as that upheld by the
53 Stanford in fact did not change its assignment language until after the Supreme Court’s
decision in Stanford v. Roche.
54 Even among some IP professors there is a belief that this is prohibited under the com-
mercial law doctrine on nemo dat quod non habet. This is clearly rejected by the Fed-
eral Circuit in its decisions beginning at least with FilmTec.
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Delaware Court of Chancery in Cephalon, Inc. v. Johns Hopkins University.55 In
that case, Johns Hopkins required employees to include a clause in their outside
consulting agreements stating that the outside entity agrees that the employee is
under an obligation to assign her inventions to the university and that this obliga-
tion is senior to any invention assignments the outside entity might impose. In the
case at issue, the researcher had done just that and the Court of Chancery upheld
the validity and enforceability of this clause as against Cephalon. The challenge
with this approach is that it is only as good as the diligence of employees in imple-
menting it. Further, employees may not realize that assignment language may be in
other kinds of agreements, such as the VCA in Stanford.
4. CONCLUSION
In the end, Stanford may be more important for what the Supreme Court did
not decide than for what it did. The practice of relying on Bayh-Dole as a backstop
to assignment problems should never have developed. Further, universities’ failure
to adapt their agreements after FilmTec, and for California universities, Shaw, have
left them vulnerable to the kinds of intervening conveyances that occurred in Stan-
ford. However, these are entirely preventable provided that universities put in place
appropriate assignment terms. Even if the Supreme Court overturns the Federal
Circuit’s federal common law — as a general principle or specific to the assign-
ment issue — this author is unaware of any state law that holds “agree to assign”
language as having the same legal effect as “hereby assign” language. Thus, in the
end, the debate over whether there should be federal common law on this point or
not will be of no legal moment. 
55 2009 WL 4896227 (Del. Ch. 2009).
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